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ABSTRACT 
German companies or German-based subsidiaries of international businesses may become 
subject of, or otherwise involved in, investigations by German or foreign regulatory or law 
enforcement authorities.  In the context of such investigations, it is not unusual for the 
concerned company to face informal requests from German or foreign regulatory and law 
enforcement authorities for voluntary cooperation. Oftentimes, such requests focus on the 
transfer of electronic data for investigatory purposes, and such data typically relate, in 
whole or in part, to individuals (e.g. employees, suppliers and customers). 
 
In these and other cases, compliance of German companies or German-based subsidiaries 
with informal requests from regulatory and law enforcement authorities may itself entail 
a compliance risk or even constitute a breach by the corporate entity of the German data 
protection laws resulting in criminal prosecution, administrative sanctions, or damage 
claims and other actions by third party individuals.  This article outlines the scope of 
application of the German Federal Data Protection Act, introduces the applicable statu-
tory provisions, and discusses the relevant considerations in the context of an informal 
request by a regulatory or law enforcement authority for voluntary cooperation in the 
context of global investigations, in particular where a German-based entity faces requests 
from authorities abroad. 
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   Many German companies maintain business operations or perform business activities 
abroad and, equally, many international businesses maintain subsidiaries in Germany. 
In doing so, the German companies are required to comply with the laws applicable to 
them in the countries where they maintain operations or perform business activities, 
and the German-based subsidiaries of international businesses are required to comply 
with German law. Against this background, in suspected cases of non-compliance with 
applicable laws, it is not unusual for corporate entities based in Germany to become 
subject of, or otherwise involved in, investigations by German or foreign regulatory or 
law enforcement authorities. The Siemens case, the Daimler case, the LIBOR case or, 
most recently, the investigations in the automotive sector are prominent examples of 
global investigations involving German companies or German-based subsidiaries of 
international businesses. In the context of such investigations, it is not unusual for the 
concerned company to face informal requests from German or foreign regulatory and 
law enforcement authorities for voluntary cooperation. Oftentimes, such requests focus 
on the transfer of electronic data for investigatory purposes, and such data typically 
relate, in whole or in part, to individuals (e.g. employees, suppliers and customers).1 In 
the context of an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), for example, pursuant to a memorandum is-
sued by the Deputy Attorney General of the DOJ on September 9, 2015 on the individ-
ual accountability for corporate wrongdoing (“Yates Memorandum”), “to be eligible for 
any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the Department all relevant facts 
about the individuals involved in corporate misconduct.”2 Given the variety of potential 
adverse consequences of non-cooperation including fines, sanctions, loss of cooperation 
credit, and negative media coverage3, companies will typically be inclined to comply 
with any such informal request for voluntary cooperation including the required data 
transfers. 
 
While this position is understandable, German companies and subsidiaries of interna-
tional businesses located in Germany should thoroughly reflect on the legal implications 
of the actions required to comply with such a request.4 The reason for this is that, under 
German law, informal requests by German or foreign regulatory and law enforcement 
authorities do not per se form a legal basis for the required actions. Rather, the German-
based corporate entity has to asses, taking into account the legal rules and regulations 			
1  Tim Wybitul, How to Conduct E-mail Reviews in Germany, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 59, 62 
(2016). 
2  DOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Yates Memorandum, September 9, 2015 
(www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download), p. 3. 
3  For an account of a case of operational and reputational damage as a consequence of the lack of cooperation, 
see Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 74, 84 
(2015).     
4  On the conflicting priorities in such situations, see Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collecting Evidence in 
Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Criminal Proceedings,  COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 26, 
52 et seq. (2016). 
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applicable to it, whether or not it is actually permitted to meet an informal request of a 
German or foreign regulatory and law enforcement authority. In certain cases, compli-
ance of the corporate entity with such an informal request may itself entail a compliance 
risk or even constitute a breach by the corporate entity of the laws applicable to it result-
ing in criminal prosecution, administrative sanctions, or damage claims and other ac-
tions by third party individuals.5 In this context and in relation to requested transfers of 
personal data, the data protection laws applicable in Germany, particularly the German 
Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz – “FDPA”), are especially im-
portant to be taken into consideration.6  
 
This article outlines the scope of application of the FDPA (I.), introduces the applicable 
statutory provisions, and discusses the relevant considerations in connection with an 
informal request by a regulatory or law enforcement authority for voluntary coopera-
tion in the context of global investigations (II. and III.), in particular where a German 
based entity faces requests from authorities abroad (III.).  While this article focuses on 
the current legal framework in Germany governed by the FDPA and the European Data 
Protection Directive of 1995 (“DPD”), it also takes into account the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (“GDPR”)7 as published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union on May 4, 2016 by way of reference where appropriate. As from May 2018, the 
legal framework for the protection of personal data in the European Union will be pri-
marily governed by the provisions of the GDPR. 
 
I. THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL DATA PRO-
TECTION ACT 
 
   At present, the FDPA constitutes the central legal framework in the area of data pro-			
5  See Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collecting Evidence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel 
Criminal Proceedings,  COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 26, 36 (2016): “The collecting of evidence itself 
must certainly be compliant with all applicable laws, i.e. must not violate any criminal, data protection or labor 
laws.” 
6  See Christian Pelz, Ambiguities in International Internal Investigations, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 
14, 16 (2016): “Privacy and data protection issues are of major concern in any kind of compliance review, com-
pliance audit and in particular in international internal investigations.”   
 Under certain circumstances, stricter legal standards may apply in addition to, or in lieu of, the FDPA, such as 
the German Telemedia Act and the German Telecommunications Act, or in the case of the personal data of 
the customers of credit institutions, the principles of banking secrecy.  These standards will not be addressed 
in this article.  As to the standards applicable under German law to email reviews, see Tim Wybitul, How to 
Conduct E-mail Reviews in Germany, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 59 et seq. (2016); Tim Wybitul & 
Wolf-Tassilo Böhm, E-Mail-Kontrollen für Compliance-Zwecke und bei internen Ermittlungen, CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE-ZEITSCHRIFT, 133, 133 (2015). 
7  See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protec-
tion of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), O.J. 2016, L 119/1 (hereinafter 
“GDPR”). 
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tection in Germany. The FDPA implements the DPD which aims to harmonize the 
data protection regimes in all EU Member States.8 The purpose of the DPD is “to protect 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to 
privacy with respect to the processing of personal data”.9 Correspondingly, it is the pur-
pose of the FDPA “to protect the individual against his/her right to privacy being im-
paired through the handling of his/her personal data”.10     
 
A. The Concept of “Personal Data” 
 
The concept of “personal data”, under German and European law, is broad11 and en-
compasses any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person, the 
so-called data subject.12 Pursuant to the Article 29 Working Party, a committee of repre-
sentatives of the national data protection authorities of the EU Member States, “a per-
son can be considered as “identified” when, within a group of persons, he or she is "distin-
guished" from all other members of the group.” 13 In contrast, an “identifiable” person is 
“a person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, men-
tal, economic, cultural or social identity”.14 Personal data within this meaning can be 
included, for instance, in notebook entries, personal files, minutes, documentation relat-
ing to goods, services and financial transactions, information about customers, suppliers 
and business partners. Such data is often significant for regulatory or criminal investiga-
tions as it can provide evidence for the behavior of one or more individuals, corporate 
bodies such as boards or committees or even the business practice throughout a compa-
ny or an entire corporate group. 			
8  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, O. J. 1995, L 
281/31 (“Data Protection Directive” or “DPD”).  For information on the DPD, see Paul M. Schwartz &Daniel 
J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European Union, CALIFORNIA LAW 
JOURNAL, 877, 882-884 (2014); Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and 
Procedures, HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 1966, 1971-1979 (2013); Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the 
Cloud, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, 1624, 1639-1642 (2013); Virginia Boyd, Financial Priva-
cy in the United States and the European Union: A Path to Transatlantic Supervisory Harmonization, 
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 939, 958-967 (2006). 
9   Article 1(1) DPD.  
10  Section 1(1) FDPA. 
11  See Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, June 20, 2007, p. 4 
(“The Directive contains a broad notion of personal data”).  As to the common features and differences of the 
concepts used in the U.S. and Europe, see Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Infor-
mation in the United States and European Union, CALIFORNIA LAW JOURNAL, 877, 881 et seq. (2014); Paul 
M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, HARVARD LAW RE-
VIEW, 1966, 1968-1992 (2013); more profoundly, James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: 
Dignity versus Liberty, YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1151, 1153 et seq. (2004). 
12  Section 3(1) FDPA, Article 2a) DPD.  
13  Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, June 20, 2007, p. 12.  
14  Article 2a) DPD.  For a more detailed analysis, see Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept 
of personal data, WP 136, June 20, 2007, p. 12 et seq.  
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B. “Collection, Processing and Use” of Personal Data 
 
The FDPA governs the “collection, processing and use of personal data” in Germany.15  
“Collection”, per its definition, is the obtaining of data regarding the data subject.16  
“Processing”, on the other hand, includes various activities within the scope of activity of 
a company subject to an information request by an authority. Thus, “processing” cap-
tures, inter alia, the transfer of such personal data.17 “Transfer”, in turn, means the dis-
closure to a third party of personal data stored or obtained by means of data processing 
through transmission of the data to the third party or, in the terms of the DPD, the 
“disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available” of personal 
data.18 
  
In view of the above, the provision by companies of information relating to individuals 
such as employees, suppliers and customers to public authorities may be relevant under 
the FDPA in two respects: First, the provision by the company may qualify as transfer 
and, thus, processing of personal data within the meaning of the FDPA. Second, the 
receipt of the information by the public authority may qualify as collection of personal 
data within the meaning of the FDPA. 
II. DATA TRANSFERS TO GERMAN REGULATORY OR LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AUTHORITIES 
 
   In regard to the collection of personal data by a public authority from a private sector 
entity, the FDPA establishes a clear distinction:  In such cases, the public authority shall 
either inform the private sector entity of the legal provision requiring the disclosure, i.e. 
the transfer, of the relevant personal data or, alternatively, of the fact that such disclo-
sure is voluntary.19 In the former case, and assuming the requirements of the relevant 
provision are met, the private sector entity is legally obliged to transfer the relevant per-
sonal data to the public authority. In the latter case, i.e. in the absence of a statutory 
obligation to transfer the relevant personal data, the private sector entity, before transfer-
ring the relevant personal data, has to ensure that it is actually allowed to do so.20  			
15   Section 1(2) FDPA, Article 3(1) DPD. Also see Article 4(2) GDPR. 
16  Section 3(3) FDPA. Examples in legal literature for the “collection” of personal data include the request of 
personal records or the active receiving of media or documentation including personal information, see Ulrich 
Dammann, in BDSG, Section 3 m.n. 109, (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); see also Benedikt Buchner, in BDSG, 
Section 3 m.n. 26 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
17  Section 3(4) Sent. 1 FDPA.  See Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on surveillance of electronic 
communications for intelligence and national security purposes, December 5, 2014, p. 37-38. 
18  Section 3(4) Sent. 2 No. 3a) FDPA and Article 2b) DPD.  Also see Article 4(2) GDPR. 
19  Section 13(1a) FDPA. 
20  Bettina Sokol & Philip Scholz, in BDSG, Section 13 m.n. 30 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Peter Wedde, in 
BDSG, Section 13 m.n. 21 (Wolfgang Däubler, Thomas Klebe, Peter Wedde & Thilo Weichert, 5th ed. 2016); 	
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Pursuant to the general rule set forth in Section 4(1) FDPA, the transfer of personal data 
by a private entity to a third party, including a requesting regulatory or law enforcement 




As regards the consent of the data subject, such consent shall be effective only when 
based on the “data subject’s free decision” (Section 4a(1) FDPA).21  Further, “data subjects 
shall be informed of the purpose of collection, processing or use and, in so far as the cir-
cumstances of the individual case dictate or upon request, of the consequences of withhold-
ing consent.  Consent shall be given in writing unless special circumstances warrant any 
other form”.22  Additionally, due to its voluntary nature, consent can be withdrawn at 
any time, removing the legal basis for the processing.23 In an investigation context, for a 
company facing an information request by a public authority, it is oftentimes not a 
viable option to obtain the consent of the relevant data subjects.  In some cases, where 
the relevant information relates to a vast number of individuals, this would require an 
excessive administrative effort; in other cases, the request for consent would make the 
relevant individual aware of the investigation and, thus, potentially defeat its objective 
and purpose.  Also, with regard to employees’ personal data (see II.B. below), there is a 
controversy as to whether and to what extent an employee’s consent vis-à-vis the em-
ployer can be regarded as a free decision within the meaning of Section 4a(1) FDPA due 
to the imbalance of power inherent in the employment relationship, and, consequently, 
calls the processing of the data by the employer into question.24  Finally, the concerned 
individuals may decide not to grant their consent or, after having initially granted the 
consent, to withdraw it at a later stage. 
 
B. Statutory Authorizations – Legitimate Purpose, Necessity and Balancing of 
Interests 			
Jutta Stender-Vorwachs, in BeckOK BDSG, Section 13 m.n. 16 (Heinrich Amadeus Wolff & Stefan Brink et al 
15th ed. 2015). 
21  The concept of consent remains a legal basis for processing also under the GDPR (see Article 6(1) a) GDPR).  
The requirements for a consent to be valid under the GDPR are stipulated in Article 7 GDPR. 
22  Section 4a(1) FDPA. 
23  After the withdrawal of the consent by the data subject, the consent no longer constitutes a legal basis for the 
use of the relevant personal data. Correspondingly, the relevant personal data may no longer be used, unless a 
statutory authorization is available.  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 4a  m.n. 94, 96, 103 (Spiros Simitis, 8th 
ed. 2014); Kai-Uwe Plath, in BDSG, Section 4a m.n. 70 et seq. (Kai-Uwe Plath, 1st ed. 2013); Jürgen Taeger, in 
BDSG, Section 4a m.n. 81 et seq. (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd  ed. 2013). 
24  The Article 29 Working Party has voiced its skepticism in this context, see Opinion 8/2001 on the processing 
of personal data in the employment context, 5062/01/EN/Final, WP 48, September 13, 2001, p. 23;  Working 
document on a common interpretation of Article 26(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, 
2093/05/EN, WP 114, p. 11.  The German Federal Labor Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), though, has stated that 
even in an employment context there is no reason in principle why an employee’s consent should not be con-
sidered a free decision, judgment of December 11, 2014 (8 AZR 1010/13). 
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As regards the statutory authorization to process personal data, the FDPA contains a 
number of provisions which explicitly allow for the processing, including transfer and 
collection, of personal data, subject to the requirements and limitations described there-
in.  The common feature of these provisions is that each one of them sets forth a specific 
purpose for which, and only for which, the data controller is authorized to process the 
relevant personal data. While most of the statutory purposes are not relevant in an in-
vestigation context, the statutory authorizations relating to data processing for criminal 
prosecution purposes, for averting threats to state or public security, and for the protection 
of the legitimate interests of the company or a third party may generally be applicable.  
 
1. Criminal Prosecution Purposes 
 
The FDPA allows for processing of personal data for criminal prosecution purposes.25 
In this context, however, slightly different legal regimes are applicable to personal data 
relating to employees and personal data relating to other individuals. 
 
Employee data.  While, pursuant to Section 32(1) FDPA, personal data of an employee 
may be collected, processed or used to detect criminal offences, employees benefit from 
a higher level of data protection than other individuals.  In the case of employees, docu-
mented factual indications are required that the data subject has committed a criminal 
offence in connection with his employment.26 As a consequence, first, the suspicion of a 
criminal offense is required as opposed to an offense of an administrative nature.27 Se-
cond, mere assumptions or speculations as to a potential criminal offense potentially 
committed by a given employee are not sufficient, as strong as they may be;  actual fac-
tual indications are required.28 Third, indications of a criminal offense potentially com-
mitted by a given employee unrelated to his employment are not in scope.29 Fourth, the 
relevant indications, including the damage occurred, the potential suspects, and the 
indications which are at the heart of the suspicion, are to be duly documented in written 			
25  Section 32(1) and 28(2) No. 2b) FDPA. 
26  Section 32(1) Sent. 2 FDPA. 
27  Achim Seifert, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 102 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); René Erfurth, Der „neue” Arbeit-
nehmerdatenschutz im BDSG, NEUE JURISTISCHE ONLINE-ZEITSCHRIFT, 2914, 2921 (2009); Tim Wybitul, 
Das neue Bundesdatenschutzgesetz: Verschärfte Regeln für Compliance und interne Ermittlungen, BETRIEBS-
BERATER 1582, 1584 (2009). 
28  Oliver Zöll, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 50 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Achim Seifert, in 
BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 103 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Uwe H. Schneider, Investigative Maßnahmen und 
Informationsweitergabe im konzernfreien Unternehmen und im Konzern, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELL-
SCHAFTSRECHT, 1201, 1206 (2010); Christiane Bierekoven, Korruptionsbekämpfung vs. Datenschutz nach der 
BDSG-Novelle, COMPUTER UND RECHT, 203, 206 (2010); René Erfurth, Der „neue” Arbeitnehmerdaten-
schutz im BDSG, NEUE JURISTISCHE ONLINE-ZEITSCHRIFT, 2914, 2920 (2009); Tim Wybitul, Das neue 
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz: Verschärfte Regeln für Compliance und interne Ermittlungen, BETRIEBS-BERATER, 
1582, 1584 (2009). 
29  Oliver Zöll, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 51 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Achim Seifert, in 
BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 102 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
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form or electronically.30 Finally, the rights of participation of works councils must be 
observed.31  This relates to certain participation and consultation rights granted to works 
councils by applicable labor laws.32 
 
Data relating to other individuals.  To the extent applicable in an employment context33, 
as well as more generally in a commercial context, the data transfer to regulatory or law 
enforcement authorities must otherwise meet the requirements stipulated in Section 28 
FDPA.34 This provision sets forth various specific statutory authorizations which allow 
for the processing and transfer of personal data under certain conditions including to 
prosecute criminal offences.35 As is the case in the employment context, only the prosecu-
tion of criminal offenses, as opposed to administrative offenses, is in scope.36 Other than 
that, the requirements under Section 28 FDPA are less stringent than in an employment 
context, and, for example, the documentation of the suspicion or the involvement of a 
works council, if any, are not mandatory (see above). 
 
2. Averting Threats to State or Public Security 
 
The FDPA further also allows for the processing of personal data in order to avert 
threats to state or public security.37 The powers granted under this provision are relatively 
broad.  This notwithstanding, it does not generally allow for the processing of personal 
data for public interest purposes; in using the term “threats to state or public security”, 
the legislator has deliberately opted for a narrower term as opposed to a general public 
interest exemption.38 Also, the provision requires a concrete risk of such a threat, a mere 
			
30  Oliver Zöll, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 52 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
31  Section 32(3) FDPA. 
32  See, for example, Section 75(2), 80, and 87(1) No. 6 of the Works Council Constitution Act (Betriebsverfas-
sungsgesetz); for additional detail, see Tim Wybitul, How to Conduct E-mail Reviews in Germany, COMPLI-
ANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAl, 59, 72 (2016).  
33  There is some dispute in legal literature as to whether or to what extent Section 28 FDPA is applicable along-
side Section 32 FDPA in an employment context, see Oliver Zöll, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 7 (Jürgen Taeger 
& Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Achim Seifert, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 17 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Uwe 
H. Schneider, Investigative Maßnahmen und Informationsweitergabe im konzernfreien Unternehmen und im 
Konzern, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT, 1201, 1205 (2010); Christiane Bierekoven, Korrup-
tionsbekämpfung vs. Datenschutz nach der BDSG-Novelle, COMPUTER UND RECHT, 203, 206 (2010); René 
Erfurth, Der „neue” Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz im BDSG, NEUE JURISTISCHE ONLINE-ZEITSCHRIFT, 2914, 
2922 (2009). 
34  See Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 31 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); similar Spiros 
Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 22 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
35  Section 28(2) No. 2 b) FDPA. 
36  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28  m.n. 190 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Kai-Uwe Plath, in BDSG, Section 
28 m.n. 97 (Kai-Uwe Plath, 1st ed. 2013); Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 146 (Jürgen Taeger & 
Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
37  Section 28(2) No. 2b) FDPA. 
38  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28  m.n. 190 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
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abstract risk is not sufficient.39 Finally, specific statutory authorizations set forth in the 
laws applicable to the relevant regulatory or enforcement authorities take precedence 
over this particular exemption to the effect that such authorities have to rely on such 
specific authorizations, if any, to request the relevant data from private companies and 
may not rely on Section 28(2) No. 2b) FDPA where such statutory authorization does 
not exist or its requirements are not met.40 
 
3. Protection of the Legitimate Interests of the Company or a Third Party 
 
Finally, the FDPA allows for the processing of personal data to protect the legitimate 
interests of the company or a third party.41 Both authorizations are to be interpreted 
narrowly.42 
 
Legitimate interests of the company. Legitimate interests of the company within this 
meaning may be both monetary as well as non-monetary interests.43 The keen interest of 
a requesting third party, including regulatory or law enforcement authorities, does not 
qualify as a legitimate interest of the company.44 A cooperative relationship of the com-
pany with the relevant regulatory or law enforcement authority in general and the com-
pliance with an informal request of such an authority, including to avoid potential ad-
verse consequences of non-cooperation, should typically count among the legitimate 
interests of a company, the warranted narrow interpretation notwithstanding. 
 
Legitimate interests of a third party. There is no reason in principle why regulatory or 
law enforcement authorities should be excluded from the term “third party”. Therefore, 
the company facing an informal information request has to assess whether or not such 
information request is based on reasonable needs for information on the part of the 
requesting authority and whether or not such informational needs qualify as legitimate 
interests within this meaning. 
 
4. Additional Requirements: Necessity and Balancing of Interests 
 
Necessity. In each of the cases described above, the processing of the personal data must 
be “necessary” to pursue the legitimate purpose, i.e. to investigate the alleged criminal 
offence, to avert the threats to state or public security, or to protect the legitimate inter-			
39  Kai-Uwe Plath, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 97 (Kai-Uwe Plath, 1st ed. 2013); Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 
28 m.n.144 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
40  Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n.146 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, in 
BDSG, Section 28  m.n. 192 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
41  Section 28(2) No. 1 and No. 2a) FDPA. 
42  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 98 and 174 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
43  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 104 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 
m.n.55 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
44  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 107 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
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ests of the company or a third party.45 The term “necessary” is generally interpreted nar-
rowly and strictly.46 As a consequence, it has to be examined carefully whether the en-
visaged data transfer could be replaced by a less intrusive action or the corresponding 
goal otherwise pursued by less intrusive means.47 
 
Balancing of interests. Further, in each of the cases described above, the data subject’s 
“legitimate interest” in keeping his personal data undisclosed are to be adequately taken 
into account.48 More precisely, in the case of data processing for the purpose of criminal 
prosecution, averting threats to state or public security and the protection of legitimate 
interests of a third party, there must not be any “reason to believe that the data subject 
has such legitimate interest” at all.49 In other words, a data transfer may not be based on 
the corresponding statutory authorizations if there is at least one single reason for the 
concerned individual providing for a legitimate interest of such individual to maintain 
his personal data undisclosed. Slightly less strict, in the case of data processing for the 
purpose of the protection of legitimate interests of the company, the data subject must 
not have an “overriding legitimate interest” in maintaining the confidentiality of his 
data.50 This requires a comprehensive proportionality assessment to evaluate the suita-
bility of the data processing for the purpose pursued, its necessity relative to potentially 
less intrusive means (see above), as well as its adequacy, especially in regards to the type 
and extent of data processing.51 In the course of this assessment, a comprehensive balanc-
ing of interests is required whereby the interests in favor of the data transfer (the self-
interests of the company) are to be weighed against the interest of the data subject in 
keeping his data confidential. As a result of such assessment, the interests of the data 			
45  Section 28(2) No. 1 and No. 2a) and b) FDPA. See Article 6(1) d), e) and f) GDPR. 
46  Achim Seifert, in BDSG, Section 32  m.n. 11 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Katrin Stamer & Michael Kuhnke, 
in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 16 (Kai-Uwe Plath, 1st ed. 2013); Oliver Zöll, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 16 (Jürgen 
Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28  m.n. 182 et seq. (Spiros Simitis, 8th 
ed. 2014); Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 135 et seq. (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
47  Achim Seifert, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 105 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Tim Wybitul, Das neue Bundesda-
tenschutzgesetz: Verschärfte Regeln für Compliance und interne Ermittlungen, BETRIEBS-BERATER, 1582, 1583 
(2009).  
48  Section 32(1) Sent. 2 and Section 28(2) No. 1 and No. 2 FDPA. 
49  Section 28(2) No. 1 and 2 FDPA.  A similar requirement is explicitly mentioned only in Article 6(1) f) GDPR 
(data processing necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by a controller or a third party).  
However, Article 6(3) GDPR states that the legal basis of the data processing referred to in Article 6(1) c) and 
e) GDPR (processing necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject or 
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority 
vested in the controller) must be rooted in European Union law or the law of the Member State to which the 
controller is subject.  The law of the Member State must meet a public interest objective or must be necessary 
to protect the rights and freedoms of others, respect the essence of the right to the protection of personal data 
and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  In the context of the corresponding assessment, the legit-
imate interests of the data subject should obviously be taken into consideration.  
50  Section 28(1) Sent. 1 No. 2 FDPA. 
51  Oliver Zöll, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 53 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Achim Seifert, in 
BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 106 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Jan Pohle, Unterlagen-, Daten- und E-
Mailauswertung unter Berücksichtung datenschutzrechtlicher Aspekte, in: Deutsch-Amerikanische Korrupti-
onsverfahren 309, 316 (Jürgen Wessing & Matthias Dann eds., 2013). 
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subject take precedence particularly in situations where the type and extent of the data 
processing are disproportionate to the purpose pursued.52 Also, in the context of regula-
tory or criminal investigations, it is of particular relevance whether the concerned indi-
vidual is a suspect, a potential witness or a person not involved in the investigated mis-
conduct. While the FDPA also generally protects the personal data of criminal sus-
pects53, in connection with the proportionality assessment, the interest of not getting 
involved in, or subject of, a regulatory or criminal investigation may weigh stronger in 
the case of potential witnesses or persons unrelated to the investigated misconduct than 
in the case of suspects. 
III. DATA TRANSFERS TO FOREIGN REGULATORY OR LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AUTHORITIES 
 
  The FDPA applies where the controller is either located or collects or processes person-
al data in Germany.54 A German-based corporate entity subject to an informal infor-
mation request by a foreign regulatory or law enforcement authority has to assess, in 
addition to the legality of the preparatory data collection, the permissibility of the envis-
aged data transfer in light of Sections 4b and 4c FDPA.55 These provisions establish 
specific requirements for the transfer of personal data across borders which apply in 
addition to the requirements applicable in a domestic context (see II. above).56 They 
further differentiate between data transfers to recipients located in EU or EEA Member 
States (see A. below) and data transfers to recipients located in what is known as Third 
Countries (see B. below). 
 
A. Regulatory or Law Enforcement Authorities located in EU or EEA Member 
States 
 
Data transfers to recipients located in EU or EEA Member States are primarily governed 
by Section 4b(1) FDPA which reads: “The transfer of personal data to bodies 1. in other 
Member States of the European Union, 2. in other states parties to the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area or 3. institutions and bodies of the European Communities 
shall be subject to (…) Sections 28 to 30a in accordance with the laws and agreements ap-			
52  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28  m.n. 180 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Kai-Uwe Plath, in BDSG, Section 
28 m.n. 53 and 95 et seq. (Kai-Uwe Plath, 1st ed. 2013); Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 61 et seq. (Jür-
gen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013).  
53   See Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28  m.n. 190 et. seq and 195 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Kai-Uwe Plath, 
in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 97 (Kai-Uwe Plath, 1st ed. 2013); Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 141 and 
145 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). Also see Article 10 GDPR. 
54  Section 1(5) FDPA. 
55  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 9 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013) Spiros Simitis, in 
BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 38-39 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Philipp Räther & Nicolai Seitz, Übermittlung per-
sonenbezogener Daten in Drittstaaten Angemessenheitsklausel, Safe Harbor und die Einwilligung, MULTI-
MEDIA UND RECHT, 425, 426 (2002). 
56  Section 28 et seq. FDPA. 
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plicable to such transfer, in so far as transfer is effected in connection with activities which 
fall in part or in their entirety within the scope of the law of the European Communi-
ties.” Hence, the transfer of personal data to recipients in EU or EEA Member States is 
generally subject to the requirements applicable in a domestic context as discussed 
above, although in accordance with the laws and agreements applicable to such transfer, 
inasmuch as the transfer is effected in connection with activities which fall either entirely 
or in part within the scope of the law of the European Communities.57  
 
1. Prerequisite Requirements: Precedence Rule and Limited Scope of Applica-
bility 
 
This requirement raises at least two potential pitfalls to companies willing to comply 
with an informal request from an EU or EEA authority. 
   
Precedence rule. First, the provision states that the cross-border transfer of personal data 
has to occur “in accordance with the laws and agreements applicable to such transfer”.58  
This requirement implies that the envisaged data transfer, including its limits and condi-
tions, is subject to special laws or bilateral or multilateral agreements, if any such law or 
agreement applies in the specific case.59 Such laws or agreements may take precedence 
over the general data protection provisions contained in the FDPA and set forth the 
legal requirements applicable to the envisaged transfer.60 As a consequence, special at-
tention should be paid to whether or not a specific legal regime for cross-border data 
transfer exists in a given case and, if so, whether the specific requirements set forth in 
such regime are met. 
 
Limited scope of applicability. Second, the provision generally only authorizes cross-
border data transfers to the extent “activities which fall in part or in their entirety within 
the scope of the law of the European Communities” are affected. This refers to what was 
formerly known as the first pillar of the European Union pursuant to the Maastricht 
Treaty and, broadly speaking, comprised the area of economic and trade cooperation.61 
The first pillar should be distinguished from what was formerly known as the second 
pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and the third pillar (Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters).62 The wording of Section 4b FDPA should be seen 			
57  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 10-13 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, in 
BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 25-37 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
58  Section 4b(1) FDPA. 
59  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 37 and 40 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
60  LUTZ BERGMANN, ROLAND MÖHRLE & ARMIN HERB, BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 24 (loose-leaf booklet ed. 
2014); Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 40 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Sec-
tion 4b m.n. 12 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
61  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 11 and 14 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, 
in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 33 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
62  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 11 and 14 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel 2nd ed. 2013). 
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in light of Art. 3(2) DPD. Pursuant to this provision, the DPD shall not apply to the 
processing of personal data “in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of 
Community law (…) and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, 
defense, State security (…) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law”.63 Ra-
ther, the protection of personal data in connection with data transfers between EU 
Member States in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters is, since 
recently, governed by a particular directive.64 As to the qualification of a given activity as 
falling inside or outside the scope of Community law, neither the wording nor case law 
of German courts give clear guidance as to which activity should be taken into account 
in this context – the business activities of the company (which should usually fall within 
the scope of the first pillar) or the investigative activities of the regulatory or law en-
forcement authorities to which the company is supposed to contribute by transferring 
the data (which may fall into the scope of the third pillar). In the so-called PNR decision 
of 2006, however, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) implicitly decided in favor of 
the latter.65 In the corresponding case, the ECJ had been asked by the European Parlia-
ment to annul the so-called PNR Agreement concluded between the EU and the U.S. in 
2004.66 The 2004 PNR Agreement allowed for the competent U.S. authority to access 
the PNR data stored in the reservation/departure control systems of air carriers located 
within the territory of EU Member States for the purpose of “preventing and combating 
terrorism and related crimes and other serious crimes that are transnational in nature, 
including organised crime”. In the decision handed down by the ECJ, the ECJ held that 
the 2004 PNR Agreement was invalid due to the lack of a suitable legal basis in Com-
munity law. The ECJ explained that “the transfer of PNR data to CBP constitutes pro-
cessing operations concerning public security and the activities of the State in areas of 
criminal law”67 and, therefore, could not be based on the DPD or otherwise on Com-
			
63  The scope of application of the GDPR is similarly restricted to the processing of personal data “in the course 
of an activity which falls within the scope of Union law” (which is, admittedly, more extensive than the law of 
the (former) European Communities) (see Article 2(2) a) GDPR).  However, the GDPR also excludes from its 
scope of application data processing “by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, de-
tection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties” (Article 2(2) d) GDPR) which 
mirrors what is set forth in Article 3(2) DPD. 
64  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 04/27/2016 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investiga-
tion, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free move-
ment of such data, and repeating Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, O.J. 2016, L 119/89. 
65  See ECJ, judgment May 30, 2006 (PNR) – C-317/04 – m.n. 56.  The acronym PNR stands for Passenger 
Name Record data (specific files on every passenger and journey created by air carriers) and relates to the 
transatlantic transfer of information contained in these files for law enforcement purposes.  For additional de-
tail, see Valentin M. Pfisterer, PNR in 2011: Recalling Ten Years of Transatlantic Cooperation in PNR Infor-
mation Management, THE UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI NATIONAL SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT LAW RE-
VIEW, 114, 120 et seq. (2012). 
66  Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Passenger Name Record data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Securi-
ty, O.J. 2004, L 183/84. 
67  ECJ, judgment May 30, 2006 (PNR) – C-317/04 – m.n. 56.   
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munity law.68  Against this background, there are good arguments that at least the trans-
fer of personal data by companies for investigative purposes of law enforcement author-
ities should be outside the scope of the law of the European Communities and, thus, 
cannot be justified under Section 4b(1) FDPA.69 Consequently, such data transfer 
would be subject to the stricter requirements under Section 4b(2) FDPA. Pursuant to 
this provision, data transfers to recipients located in the EU or the EEA “when effected 
outside of activities which fall in part or in their entirety within the scope of the law of 
the European Communities” are also subject to Section 4b(1) FDPA.  In addition, how-
ever, the provision states that such “transfer shall not be effected in so far as the data 
subject has a legitimate interest in excluding transfer, in particular if an adequate level of 
data protection is not guaranteed”.70 As this standard equally applies to data transfers to 
recipients located in so-called Third Countries, it shall be discussed below (see B. below). 
 
2. Statutory Authorizations as Applicable in a Domestic Context 
 
In addition to the requirements outlined above and by reference to Sections 28 et seq. 
FDPA,71 data transfers to recipients located in EU or EEA Member States must also 
meet the criteria applicable in a domestic context. Hence, the purpose for which the data 
is transferred must correspond to one or more of the purposes explicitly specified in 
these provisions (including criminal prosecution, averting threats to state or public secu-
rity, and the protection of the legitimate interests of the company or a third party) and 
the additional requirements (necessity and balancing of interests) have to be met (see 
II.B. above). 
 
B. Regulatory or Law Enforcement Authorities located in Third Countries 
 
Section 4b(2) FDPA provides the legal framework for cross-border data transfers to 
both recipients located in EU or EEA Member States, such transfer falling “outside of 
activities which fall in part or in their entirety within the scope of the law of the Europe-
an Communities” (see III.A.1.) above), and to recipients located in non-EU and 
non-EEA countries (so-called Third Countries), prima facie irrespective of the nature of 
the data to be transferred. In doing so, it establishes even stricter requirements for such 
data transfers compared to the requirements applicable in a EU- or EEA-internal context 
			
68  ECJ, judgment May 30, 2006 (PNR) – C-317/04 – m.n. 57 and 60; see also Valentin M. Pfisterer, PNR in 2011: 
Recalling Ten Years of Transatlantic Cooperation in PNR Information Management, THE UNIVERSITY OF 
MIAMI NATIONAL SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT LAW REVIEW, 114, 123 (2012). 
69   This notwithstanding, representatives of the German data protection authorities have indicated that they 
would look at the business activity of the company only which, as mentioned above, should usually fall with-
in the scope of the law of the (former) European Communities and, therefore, within the scope of the DPD 
and Section 4b FDPA. 
70  Section 4b(2) FDPA. 
71  Section 4b(1) FDPA. 
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(such transfer falling within the area of the first pillar of the EU).72 Pursuant to this 
provision, data transfers to recipients located in Third Countries are generally also sub-
ject to the requirements applicable in a EU- or EEA-internal context.  In addition, how-
ever, Section 4b(2) FDPA states that such “transfer shall not be effected in so far as the 
data subject has a legitimate interest in excluding transfer, in particular if an adequate 
level of data protection is not guaranteed”.  
 
1. Prerequisite Requirements: Precedence Rule and Limited Scope of Applica-
bility 
 
By reference to Section 4b(1) FDPA, data transfers to Third Countries are subject to the 
precedence rule and the limited scope of applicability as is the case for EU- or EEA-
internal data transfers. Similar to what was discussed above, this requirement raises two 
potential pitfalls to companies willing to comply with an informal request from a Third 
Country authority (see A.1.) above). 
  
Precedence rule. The transfer of personal data to recipients located in Third Countries 
has to be effected “in accordance with the laws and agreements applicable to such trans-
fer” such laws and agreements, if applicable, taking precedence over data transfers based 
on the FDPA.73 If, in a given case, such a treaty is applicable, the FDPA no longer serves 
as a suitable legal base for a transfer of personal data. 
  
Limited scope of applicability. Further, by reference to the requirements applicable in a 
EU- or EEA-internal context, cross-border data transfers to recipients located in Third 
Countries are only admissible with regard to “activities which fall in part or in their 
entirety within the scope of the law of the European Communities”.74 As a consequence, 
any data transfer to occur in the area of foreign and security policy or police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, as opposed to the area of economic and trade coopera-
tion, is out of scope and may not be based on Section 4b(2) FDPA.75  Data transfers in 
these areas typically occur based on treaties on legal and administrative assistance 
(“MLATs”).76 Examples are the U.S.-Germany MLAT from 200377 or the so-called 			
72  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 14-17 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, in 
BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 38-40 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014).  The requirements and conditions for transfers of 
personal data to Third Countries are extensively regulated in Article 44 et seq. GDPR.  
73  Section 4b(1) FDPA.   See LUTZ BERGMANN, ROLAND MÖHRLE &ARMIN HERB, BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 
24 (loose-leaf booklet ed. 2014); Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 40 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); 
Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 12 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
74  Section 4b(2) read in connection with Section 4b(1) FDPA. 
75  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 11 and 14 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, 
in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 33 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
76  LUTZ BERGMANN, ROLAND MÖHRLE & ARMIN HERB, BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 24; Detlev Gabel, in 
BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 12 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
77  See Treaties and other international Acts Series 09-1018, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United 
States of America and Germany, October 14, 2003 (www.state.gov/documents/organization/188782.pdf). 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 2   NUMBER 2   2016 
THOMAS KOPP & VALENTIN PFISTERER  |  BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 
PAGE  69 
U.S.-EU Umbrella Agreement from 201578 which both, notably enough, allow for the 
exchange of personal data between law enforcement authorities as opposed to between 
private sector companies based in one country and a public authority of another coun-
try.79 As to the qualification of a given activity as falling within or outside the scope of 
Community law, it is unclear which activity should be taken into account in this context 
– the business activities of the company or the investigative activities of the regulatory or 
law enforcement authorities to which the company is supposed to contribute by trans-
ferring the data.  There are, however, good arguments that at least the transfer of per-
sonal data by companies for investigative purposes of  law enforcement authorities lo-
cated in Third Countries should be perceived as falling outside the scope of the law of 
the European Communities and, thus, cannot be justified under Section 4b(2) FDPA 
(see A.1.) above). This is consistent with a statement made by EU Commissioner of Jus-
tice, Vera Jourova: “The Commission's view is that personal data held by private compa-
nies in the EU should not, in principle, be directly accessed by or transferred to foreign 
enforcement authorities outside of formal channels of cooperation, such as for example the 
Mutual Legal Assistance treaties (MLATs).”80 
 
2. Adequate Level of Data Protection 
 
In addition, cross-border transfers to recipients located in Third Countries are generally 
inadmissible to the extent that the “data subject has a legitimate interest” in keeping his 
data confidential which is deemed to be the case if the Third Country does not afford an 
“adequate level of data protection”.81 Such adequacy is assessed in light of all attendant 
circumstances. Particular consideration is given to the nature of the data, the purpose, 
the duration of the proposed data processing operation, the country of origin, the recip-
ient country and the legal norms, professional rules and security measures which apply 
to the recipient.82 By virtue of the DPD, the European Commission is authorized to find 
that a certain Third Country ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning 			
78  Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Protection of Personal 
Information relating to the Prevention, Investigation, Detection, and Prosecution of Criminal Offenses.  Also 
see the corresponding Fact Sheet, MEMO/15/5612 (europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5612_de.htm). 
79  The requirements set forth in the FDPA may correspond to those established in Article 47 GDPR.  Any 
judgment of a court or tribunal and any decision of an administrative authority of a Third Country requiring 
a controller or processor to transfer or disclose personal data may only be recognized or enforceable in any 
manner if based on an international agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty in force between the 
requesting Third Country and the Union or a Member State, without prejudice to other grounds for transfer 
pursuant to Article 44 et seq. GDPR. 
80  Parliamentary Questions, Answer given by Ms. Jourova on behalf of the European Commission, March 4, 
2015 (www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2014-010602&language=EN).  
81  Section 4b(2) Sent. 2 FDPA. As to the adequacy criterion, see Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Colli-
sion: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 1966, 1979-1992 (2013); Nikhil S. Pale-
kar, Privacy Protection: When is “Adequate” actually Adequate?, DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, 549 et seq. (2007/08).  
82  Section 4b(3) FDPA. For transfers based on an adequacy decision by the Commission (and the criteria which 
taken into account), see Article 45 GDPR. 
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of the DPD.83 Based thereon, the European Commission has taken a number of adequa-
cy decisions84 including with respect to the U.S., although not generally but rather lim-
ited to certain contexts such as the transfer of PNR data (in connection with the current 
PNR Agreement)85 or of account data (in connection with the SWIFT Agreement).86 
Only recently, however, in its Safe Harbor decision, the ECJ struck down an adequacy 
decision by the European Commission in relation to the U.S. highlighting the uncon-
trolled mass surveillance of personal data by U.S. government agencies.87 In its decision, 
the ECJ further emphazised that national data protection authorities may independently 
examine whether or not the level of data protection afforded in the recipient’s home 
jurisdiction is adequate—even where the European Commission has adopted an ade-
quacy decision in respect of the relevant country.88 Also, in addition to the level of data 
protection, other aspects may qualify as a legitimate interest and consequently exclude a 
cross-border data transfer. It may therefore be relevant whether or not the requesting 
Third Country authority, under the rules and regulations applicable to it, is legally enti-
tled to collect the relevant data, whether or not the information request is otherwise 
lawful or unlawful, or, again, whether or not the requesting Third Country authority 
has formal means at its disposal to request and obtain the relevant data.89 In addition, it 
might also be relevant whether the concerned individual is a suspect, a potential witness 
or a person not involved in the wrongdoing being investigated (see II.B.4.) above).90 
 
In cases where no adequate level of protection is provided for, or where the data subject 
has another legitimate interest in keeping his data undisclosed, Section 4b(2) FDPA 
cannot serve as a legal basis for a data transfer to a regulatory or law enforcement author-
ity, subject to a number of explicitly specified exemptions discussed below (see 4. be-			
83  Article 25(6) DPD. 
84  See ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm. 
85  See Article 19 of the Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use 
and transfer of passenger name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, O.J. 2012, 
L215/5.  For additional detail on the 2012 PNR Agreement, see Valentin M. Pfisterer, PNR in 2011: Recalling 
Ten Years of Transatlantic Cooperation in PNR Information Management, THE UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI 
NATIONAL SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT LAW REVIEW, 114, 131 (2012). 
86  See Article 6 of the (Second) Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on 
the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, O.J. 2010, L8/11.  For additional detail on the (Second) 
SWIFT Agreement, see Valentin M. Pfisterer, The Second SWIFT Agreement Between the European Union 
and the United States of America – An Overview, GERMAN LAW JOURNAL, 1173, 1182-1187 (2010).  
87  ECJ, Judgment of October 6, 2015 (Schrems) – C-362/14 – m.n. 105; as to this decision and its consequences for 
transatlantic data transfers, see Christian Galetzka & Kevin Rodler, Goodbye Safe Harbor USA? – Daten-
transfer in die USA nach der Safe Harbor-Entscheidung des EuGH, COMPLIANCE BERATER, 470 et seq. 
(2015). 
88  ECJ, Judgment of October 6, 2015 (Schrems) – C-362/14 – m.n. 66. 
89  Representatives of the German data protection authorities have indicated that they consider the existence of a 
mutual legal assistance treaty, and therefore an “official” channel for the requesting authority to request and 
obtain the relevant data, as a relevant factor in this context.   
90  In particular in the case of an uninvolved person, her interest in not getting involved in the “mills” of the 
judicial system of a Third Country might qualify as a relevant criterion. 
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low). 
 
3. Statutory Authorizations as Applicable in a Domestic Context 
 
In addition to meeting the prerequisite requirements and the recipient affording an 
adequate level of data protection (and the data subject not having another legitimate 
interest in keeping his data undisclosed) as outlined above, by reference to Section 4b(1) 
FDPA (and, ultimately, to Sections 28 et seq. FDPA),91 data transfers to recipients locat-
ed in Third Countries must fulfill the criteria applicable in a domestic context.  Hence, 
the purpose for which the data is transferred must correspond to one or more of the 
purposes explicitly specified in these provisions (including criminal prosecution, avert-
ing threats to state or public security, and the protection of the legitimate interests of the 
company or a third party) and the additional requirements (necessity and balancing of 
interests) have to be met (see II.B. above). 
 
4. Specific Statutory Exemptions for Data Transfers to Third Countries not Af-
fording an Adequate Level of Data Protection 
 
The FDPA stipulates a number of specific exemptions from the general prohibition of 
the cross-border transfer of personal data to a Third Country in cases where such Third 
Country does not afford an adequate level of data protection (Section 4c(1) FDPA).92 
These exemptions are fairly limited in scope.93  
 
Limited scope of applicability. The exemptions for data transfers to Third Countries not 
affording an adequate level of data protection are only available “in connection with 
activities which fall in part or in their entirety within the scope of the law of the Europe-
an Communities”.94 As discussed above, it is unclear which activity should be taken into 
account in this context. There are, however, good arguments that at least the transfer of 
personal data by companies for investigative purposes of law enforcement authorities 
located in Third Countries should be perceived as falling outside the scope of the law of 
the European Communities and, thus, cannot be justified under Section 4c(1) FDPA 
(see II.B. above).   
 
As to the specific exemptions, in addition to the data subject’s consent,95 the data trans-
fer is, inter alia,  permissible if the transfer is necessary on “important public interest 			
91  Section 4b(1) FDPA. 
92  For the requirements and limits of a data transfer in the absence of an adequacy decision, see Article 49 
GDPR. 
93  Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on a mutual understanding of Article 26 (1) of the Directive 
95/46/E, 24. Oktober 1995, WP 114, 25. November 2005, p. 9; see also  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 4c m.n. 
20 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
94  Section 4c(1) FDPA.  
95  For the requirements of an effective consent, see II.A. above.  
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grounds” or for the “establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims in court”.96 
 
Important public interest grounds. The term “important public interest grounds” is not 
defined or otherwise rendered more precisely in the FDPA or the DPD. Based on the 
wording, the term is, on the one hand, broader than the term “for averting threats to 
state or public security” used in Section 28 FDPA as it does not necessarily require a 
threat of the mentioned sort. On the other hand, the term is narrower as not all public 
interest grounds are sufficient but only “important” ones. Investigations of merely ad-
ministrative offences, as opposed to criminal offences, for example, may not be of suffi-
cient importance to establish the necessary public interest. Further, pursuant to the 
Article 29 Working Party, a unilateral decision by the requesting authority does not per 
se qualify as relevant important public interest, and it is not to the requesting authority 
to decide independently whether or not its interest qualifies as an important public 
interest within this meaning.97 The reasoning of the Article 29 Working Party is as fol-
lows: “On this point the drafters of the Directive clearly did envisage that only important 
public interests identified as such by the national legislation applicable to data controllers 
established in the EU are valid in this connection.  Any other interpretation would make 
it easy for a foreign authority to circumvent the requirement for adequate protection in 
the recipient country laid down in Directive 95/46. On the other hand, Recital 58 of Di-
rective 95/4698 refers, with regard to this provision, to cases in which international ex-
changes of data might be necessary “between tax or customs administrations in different 
countries” or “between services competent for social security matters”. This specification, 
which appears to relate only to investigations of particular cases, explains the fact that this 
exception can only be used if the transfer is of interest to the authorities of an EU Mem-
ber State themselves, and not only to one or more public authorities in the third coun-
try.”99 Finally, and also in view of Recital 58 of the DPD, there is some dispute as to 
whether the important public interest-exemption is at all available to private companies 
and other private sector entities, given that the examples mentioned in the Recital – and 
the line of argument brought forward by the Article 29 Working Party – only refer to 
data transfers between public authorities as opposed to between private sector compa-
nies and public authorities.100 			
96   Section 4c(1) No. 4 FDPA (German-language version). 
97  Article 29 Working Party, Working document on a common interpretation of Article 26 (1) of Directive 
95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, WP 114, 25 November 2005, p. 14; Opinion 6/2002 on transmission of Passen-
ger Manifest Information and other data from Airlines to the United States, WP 66, 24 October 2002, p. 6.  
In this context, the GDPR clarifies that the important reasons of public interest must be recognized in Union 
law or in the law of the Member State to which the controller is subject (Article 49(4) GDPR). 
98  Recital No. 58 of the DPD mentions “cases of international transfers of data between tax or customs admin-
istrations or between services competent for social security matters” as potential cases for the important public 
interest-exemption to apply. 
99  Article 29 Working Party, Working document on a common interpretation of Article 26 (1) of Directive 
95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, WP 114, 25 November 2005, p. 15. 
100  See on the one hand: Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4c m.n. 10 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); 
on the other hand: Wolfgang Däubler, in BDSG, Section 4c m.n. 8 (Wolfgang Däubler, Thomas Klebe, Peter 
Wedde & Thilo Weichert, 4th ed. 2014).  
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Establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims in court. The FDPA also allows for data 
transfers to Third Countries not affording an adequate level of data protection for pur-
poses of the “establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims in court”.101 While the ex-
emption applies to and allows for data transfers in connection with all sorts of court 
proceedings, it is not applicable in administrative and other out-of-court proceedings. 
Therefore, based on its wording, the provision does not allow for data transfers in con-
nection with investigations by regulatory and law enforcement authorities prior to, or 
entirely unrelated to, any such court proceedings.102 Further, pursuant to the Article 29 
Working Party, this exemption is only available “if the rules governing criminal or civil 
proceedings applicable to this type of international situation have been complied with, 
notably as they derive from the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 18 March 1970 
(“Taking of Evidence” Convention) and of 25 October 1980 (“Access to Justice” Conven-
tion).”103 
 
Additional requirements: necessity and balancing of interests.  In both cases, data trans-
fers on important public interest grounds and for the establishment, exercise or defense 
of legal claims in court, the data transfer must be “necessary” for the pursuit of the rele-
vant objective.104 In this respect, as discussed above, a data transfer is only permissible 
where the information request of the Third Country authority cannot be satisfied by 
less intrusive means including by formal channels of administrative or legal cooperation 
(see II.B.4. and III.A.1. and B.2. above). 
 
Statutory authorizations as applicable in a domestic context. Finally, in addition to meet-
ing the above-mentioned requirements, data transfers to recipients located in Third 
Countries not affording an adequate level of data protection must fulfill the criteria 
applicable in a domestic context.105 Hence, the purpose for which the data is transferred 
must correspond to one or more of the purposes explicitly specified in these provisions 
(including criminal prosecution, averting threats to state or public security, and the 
protection of the legitimate interests of the company or a third party) and the additional 
requirements (necessity and balancing of interests) have to be met (see II.B. above). 			
101  Section 4c(1) No. 4 FDPA (German-language version). 
102  Interestingly enough, the authorized English-language versions of both the DPD and the FDPA do not 
contain the addition “in court”.  This inconsistency has caused and continues to cause significant uncertainty 
with respect to the applicability of the relevant provision to administrative or similar out-of-court proceed-
ings. 
 The addendum “in court” does not appear in Article 49 (1) e) GDPR.  Under the GDPR, this exemption may 
consequently allow for German companies and individuals to transfer personal data for the purpose of the es-
tablishment of legal claims or legal defenses, including in administrative and other out-of-court proceedings. 
103  Article 29 Working Party, Working document on a common interpretation of Article 26 (1) of Directive 
95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, WP 114, 25 November 2005, p. 15. 
104  Section 4c(1) No. 4 FDPA. 
105  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4c m.n. 4 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, in 
BDSG, Section 4c m.n. 6 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
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5. Specific Permit by Competent Data Protection Authority 
 
Lastly, the FDPA allows for the cross-border transfer of personal data to Third Coun-
tries, irrespective of whether or not affording an adequate level of data protection, based 
on a specific permit by the competent German data protection authority.106  According-
ly, the competent German data protection authority may authorize individual transfers 
or certain categories of transfers of personal data to bodies located in Third Countries if 
the controller guarantees adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of privacy 
and the exercise of the corresponding rights.107 This approach obviously requires that 
the company asks for and is granted adequate safeguards from the requesting Third 
Country authority, informs the competent German data protection authority of the 
envisaged data transfer in order to obtain the necessary permit, and is granted the re-
quested permit. This option may oftentimes not be available for the corporate entity 
concerned, given that a public authority is generally unlikely to contractually assure a 
certain treatment of the relevant data, in particular in an investigation context. 
 
IV. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
 
  Corporate entities based in Germany which face an informal request from a German or 
foreign regulatory or law enforcement authority for the transfer of personal data will 
typically be inclined to comply with such an informal request, given the variety of po-
tential adverse consequences of non-cooperation including fines, sanctions, loss of co-
operation credit, and negative media coverage. In certain cases, however, compliance of 
the corporate entity with such an informal request may itself entail a compliance risk, 
constitute a breach by the corporate entity of the laws applicable to it, and result in 
criminal prosecution, administrative sanctions, or damage claims and other actions by 
third party individuals. In this context and in relation to requested transfers of personal 
data, the data protection laws applicable in Germany, particularly the FDPA, are espe-
cially important to be taken into consideration.  
 
The FDPA establishes a complex and strict regime for the transfer of personal data to 
recipients, including regulatory and law enforcement authorities, both in Germany and 
abroad. The requirements for data transfers to German regulatory and law enforcement 
authorities are already rather strict. This is even more true for data transfers to regulato-
ry and law enforcement authorities located in EU or EEA Member States or even in 			
106  Section 4c(2) FDPA. 
107  Section 4c(2) FDPA.  For additional detail, see Philipp C. Räther & Nicolai Seitz, Übermittlung personenbezo-
gener Daten in Drittstaaten – Angemessenheitsklausel, Safe Harbor und die Einwilligung, MULTIMEDIA 
UND RECHT, 425 et seq. (2002) and Philipp C. Räther & Nicolai Seitz, Ausnahmen bei Datentransfer in 
Drittstaaten - Die beiden Ausnahmen nach § 4c Abs. 2 BDSG: Vertragslösung und Code of Conduct, MUL-
TIMEDIA UND RECHT, 520 et seq. (2002).  
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Third Countries. Particularly strict requirements apply to data transfers to recipients, 
including regulatory and law enforcement authorities, located in Third Countries which 
do not afford an adequate level of data protection, especially where the data are trans-
ferred for criminal prosecution and similar not strictly business-related purposes. 
 
In the past, companies facing an informal request for the transfer of personal data by a 
public authority may have considered compliance with German data protection laws a 
minor priority, especially when approached by authorities from Third Countries. In 
view of what is stated in the Yates Memorandum108, this may be particularly true in the 
context of DOJ or SEC investigations. Also, sanctions in Germany, if any, were usually 
considered soft in comparison to the fear of much more severe sanctions in Third Coun-
tries including the U.S.  As of the entry into force of the GDPR in May 2018, however, 
this is likely to change. Based on the GDPR, once applicable, the competent national 
data protection authorities will be authorized to impose fines in the event of a violation 
of the GDPR in the amount of up to EUR 20 Million or 4% of the average worldwide 
annual sales of a company.109 
			
108  DOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney general, Yates Memorandum, September 9, 2015 
(www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download), p. 3. 
109  Article 83(6) GDPR. 
